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Abstract. This paper considers a topos-theoretic structure for the in-
terpretation of co-constructive logic for proofs and refutations following
[49]. It is notoriously tricky to define a proof-theoretic semantics for log-
ics that adequately represent constructivity over proofs and refutations.
By developing abstractions of elementary topoi, we consider an elemen-
tary topos as structure for proofs, and complement topos as structure
for refutation. In doing so, it is possible to consider a dialogue structure
between these topoi, and also control their relation such that classical
logic (interpreted in a Boolean topos) is simulated where proofs and
refutations are conclusive.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Constructivism beyond intuitionism
In [49], it was argued that properties such as excluded middle and disjunc-
tion property (and even a constructive account of truth), do not capture
what is central to a constructive logic. Rather, these properties are typical
features of intuitionistic logic, whose constructivity lies in an ability to un-
derstand proofs epistemically requiring the existence of actual constructions,
and where a proposition determined by its proofs.1 By taking this as the
central feature of constructive logic, it is possible to consider logics that may
be constructive whilst not sharing properties typical to intuitionism. More
specifically, we will investigate the dual of intuitionistic logic, co-intuitionistic
1This is also taken to rule out the “potentialist” interpretation of proof [34] (and at certain
points held by Dummett [11]), in favor of an actualist, time-bound, notion of proof [18].
For discussion, see [30, 36, 40].
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logic, as a logic of refutation, alongside intuitionistic logic of proofs [49]. Di-
rect proof and refutation are dual to each other, and are constructive, whilst
there also exist syntactic, weak, negations within both logics. In this respect,
the logic of refutation is weakly paraconsistent in the sense that it allows for
statements for which, neither they, nor their negation, are refuted. In brief,
this means that, whilst intuitionistic logic LI allows us to deal with undeter-
mined formulas:
Undetermined: α ∨ ¬α is not a theorem;
co-intuitionistic logic for refutation, LC , allows us to deal with undetermined
formulas also, since the dual of “Undetermined” holds:
Inconsistent: α∧¬α is not a “counter-theorem” (where is a “refutation”
relation).
The latter should be understood constructively, as saying that there may
exists some formula α, for which neither α, nor its negation are refuted.
Taken together, the logics constitute a co-constructive logic for proofs
and refutations, which is intuitive in the context of a re-interpretation of
Kolmogorov’s logic of problems [22].2 There, the suggestion is that construc-
tive logic has to do “not with theoretical propositions but, on the contrary,
problems”.3 Following Kolmogorov, we can distinguish between problems
(which concern reasoning and argument), and solutions, which are propo-
sitions (which concern truth and falsity).4 These will be interpreted in the
below as proof and refutation attempts and conclusively valid proofs and
refutations, respectively. Kolmogorov understands refutations as reduction
to contradiction, but, instead, we will approach the notion directly here, on
a par with proof. Taken together, the situation is as follows. For any state-
ment, we consider it as a declarative statement in the form of a question: γ?
This may be considered by prover and refuter as a tentative hypothesis, to
be “tested”. If we think of these in terms of proof and refutation attempts,
then the following Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov (BHK) style clauses capture
the relationship between proof and refutation attempts for conjunction and
disjunction:
• c is a proof attempt of α ∧ β if c is a pair (c1, c2) such that c1
is a proof attempt of α and c2 is a proof attempt of β.
2As pointed out by an anonymous reviewer, it may be more appropriate to call this bi-,
rather than co-constructive logic. I agree, but stick with the original formulation, since,
whilst it has become mathematical practice to use the prefix “co” to refer to a dual (rather
than the pair), the etymology of the prefix as having to do with joint partnership and
mutual practice in English captures their relationship somewhat better.
3‘In addition to theoretical logic, which systematizes a proof schemata for theoretical
truths, one can systematize a proof schemata for solutions to problems [...] In the sec-
ond section, assuming the basic intuitionistic principles, intuitionistic logic is subjected to
a critical study; it is thus shown that it must be replaced by the calculus of problems,
since its objects are in reality problems, rather than theoretical propositions’ [22, p.58]
(Translated in [27]).
4This is reminiscent of Martin-Lo¨f’s [29] separation of judgments and propositions: ‘A proof
is, not an object, but an act [. . . ], and the act is primarily the act as it is being performed,
only secondarily, and irrevocably, does it become the act that has been performed.’
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• c is a refutation attempt of α ∧ β if c is a pair (l, c′) such that c′
is a refutation attempt of α or c is a pair (r, c′) such that c′
is a refutation attempt of β.
• c is a proof attempt of α ∨ β if c is a pair (l, c′) such that c′
is a proof attempt of α or c is a pair (r, c′) such that c′
is a proof attempt of β.
• c is a refutation attempt of α ∨ β if c is a pair (c1, c2) such that c1
is a refutation attempt of α and c2 is a refutation attempt of β.
Of course, neither of the refutation-attempt clauses are acceptable intu-
itionistically (where refutations can not be treated symmetric with proofs), or
classically, where refutations are typically dealt with by appeal to counter-
models, and in any case, neither the disjunction property (for proofs) nor
conjunction property (for refutations) holds. These are required for any con-
structive approach to inquiry, since we should not be able to say that some
formula is proved, without also being able to provide a proof of any of its
premises. In classical logic, this fails by contraction, so there may exist a
disjunction α ∨ β without any means of deciding which formula is proved.
An additional complication is that, if we want to put proofs and refutations
on the same level (and presumably non-interdefinable), then we will need to
allow for cases in which we have a “proof” of some α, whilst also allowing for
the possibility of searching to see whether or not it can be refuted (i.e. if a
“refutation” of α can be found).
This makes way for an internal duality between proofs and refutations
(in LI and LC , respectively), which renders the logic of problems symmetrical
to instantiate “dialogue” between “prover” and “refuter”.5
1.2. Proof-theoretic semantics
This paper primarily examines the construction of a proof-theoretic seman-
tics for this co-constructive logic. In general, it is desirable in constructing
such semantics that we should be capable of explicitating proofs, rather than
just establishing whether or not statements are true or false. So, the devel-
opment of proof-theoretic semantics attempts to characterize logical conse-
quence (and reasoning, more generally), in terms of proof, such that the way
in which we construct a proof is not lost.
An immediate difficulty for constructing proof-theoretic semantics is
due to an inability of intuitionistic logic to adequately deal with refutation
and falsity as pointe out in [40, 39]. The primacy of proof (in contrast to
refutation) is problematic for the development of a semantics of proofs, where
we do not want to rely upon a counter-model as stand-in for refutation. As
brief (and rough) example, take Γ+ as a set of sentential theorems, V as
some model (ordinarily set-theoretic), with a derivability relation, and
5The following is indicative of the approach that we take: ‘This permutation Prover ↔
Denier should be understood as an internal symmetry of logic itself. An analogy with
Galilean Mechanics emerges here, which we find useful to mention since it guided our
work. The idea is that the symmetry Prover ↔ Denier plays the same role as a uniform
and rectilinear change of frame of reference in Galilean Mechanics’ [31].
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a model-satisfaction relation. Then, in order to construct a proof-theoretic
semantics, we would like to (at the least) move from requiring that, for every
formula α:
either ∃Γ+(Γ+ α) or, ∃V (V α)
to:
either ∃Γ+(Γ+ α) or, ∃∆−(∆− α) (where ∆− is a set of sentential
counter-theorems, or refutations).
However, the asymmetry of proof and refutation in intuitionistic logics
renders this impossible. This is reflected by the restriction on intuitionistic
sequents to at most a single formula on the r.h.s of the turnstile;6 the indirect
interpretation of refutation as reduction to absurdity; and the fact that a
proof of α is inequivalent to ¬¬α.7 Of course, this is complicated by the fact
that it is these restrictions that ensure constructivity, for example, ensuring
by the disjunction property, that a (cut-free) proof of α∨β (where both α and
β have single, cut-free proofs), must be a proof of one of the disjuncts.8 In
logics without this restriction, such as classical logic, this fails by contraction,
so there may exist a disjunction α ∨ β without any means of deciding which
formula is proved, which is problematic if we pursue a semantics of proof.9
1.3. Bi-intuitionism
In order to deal with the above issues, we are considering a co-constructive
logic comprising intuitionistic logic for proofs, and co-intuitionistic logic for
refutations.10 This builds upon analysis of the relationship between intuition-
istic and co-intuitionistic logic as discussed in [4, 5, 7, 12, 16, 35, 37, 39, 52];
and systems of proof and refutation discussed in [41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 53, 54].
Unlike the construction suggested here, the typical relationship between intu-
itionistic and co-intuitionistic logic in the literature is not without significant
6Note that this feature is not forced on intuitionistic sequents, though restrictions on rules
or dependency relations are required to ensure that only intuitionistic derivations are valid
in sequents with multiple conclusions, see [9] for discussion. There are, nonetheless, other
reasons to think that multiple-conclusion sequents are inappropriate for the development
of a proof-theoretic semantics in a constructive, inferentialist tradition, see the discussion
in [47, 50].
7Furthermore, as Shramko et al. [40] point out, if we define falsity in terms of negation,
then we are led to a reliance, not only on a syntactic feature (negation), but also on truth,
and, as Dummett [10] is aware, this, leads to bivalence under commonly-held assumptions
regarding the nature of proofs [see author reference omitted for discussion].
8To get ahead of ourselves, this property is mirrored in co-intuitionistic logic by the “con-
junction property”, where α ∧ β iff α or β.
9Lafont [14, Appendix B.1] argues that ‘classical logic is inconsistent, not from a logical
viewpoint (false is not provable), but from an algorithmic one’, since proofs can not be
considered algorithmically, and so ‘classical logic has no denotational semantics, except the
trivial one which identifies all the proofs of the same type’. It is worth noting that, as an
anonymous reviewer suggests, this result is limited to standard sequent calculi for classical
logic, since there do exist algorithmic interpretations using the Curry-Howard-Lambek
correspondence and type theories for classical logic.
10This is dissimilar to constructions along the lines suggested by Nelson [33] since they
typically assume that falsity is equivalent to a negated truth.
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issues, and often the relationship between the two is left without intuitive in-
terpretation.11 For example, there have been a number of attempts to allow
the two logics to “cohabit” in the same structure have been explored by means
of bi-intuitionistic calculi. For example, [37] develops the algebraic analysis of
co-intuitionism given in [16], by means of bi-Heyting algebra, which combines
a Heyting algebra with the dual, co-Heyting (or Brouwerian), algebra. This
is equivalent, on Rauszer’s [37] approach, to an extension of intuitionistic
logic with a co-implication operator, which is sometimes called subtraction.
Just as negation can be defined by means of implication and 0 in a Heyting
algebra, so negation can be defined by means of co-implication and 1 in a
co-Heyting algebra: ¬Cα =df 1 ⇐ α, where ⇐ is a co-implication operator
(roughly, this is read “1 without α”.12
However, this construction of bi-intuitionism runs into significant dif-
ficulties regarding the construction of an adequate proof-theory, and proof-
theoretic semantics. In particular, it is difficult to ensure that bi-intuitionism
does not simply collapse to a (semi-)classical single logic due to the simulation
of an involution within the combined structure.13 The issue is clarified on con-
sideration of the possibility of a categorical interpretation of bi-intuitionism.
It is well-known that constructive logic suspends the principle of excluded
middle as theorem. Of course, this does not mean that principle of excluded
middle is always rejected, rather its use is controlled by context. This can be
studied structurally by means of a cartesian closed category (CCC), which
can adequately characterize the notion of constructive proof.14 However, it
is shown in [7], that, for any CCC (with final and initial objects), if it is
extended by co-exponentials (which adequately represent the co-implication
operator), then it collapses to a single partial order, and so fails to provide
adequate proof-theoretic semantics.
1.4. Symmetric dialogue topoi
In the context of co-constructive logic, the aforementioned issues relating
to “collapse” are rendered more perspicuous, such that the mechanism by
which collapse occurs can be exploited and controlled. This is possible by
constructing a proof-theoretic semantics by means of a topos-theoretic con-
struction. It is well-known that the internal logic of an elementary topos is
useful as a model of constructive provability. For example, in many topoi,
axiom of choice fails, law of excluded middle does not hold unrestrictedly,
and the double negation of a formula does not imply that formula. Resul-
tantly, they provide a natural environment for understanding intuitionistic
11With exception to the latter: [39] explores co-intuitionistic logic as Popperian logic, and
[4] develops a polarized proof-theory for the logic of pragmatics as extension of classical
logic.
12Classically, a co-implication “β ⇐ α” is defined as “β ∧ ¬α”.
13For discussion of this issue, see below, and [4, 7]. Note that, as both authors point out,
this is not the case for bi-intuitionistic linear logic, which does not collapse when merging
both intuitionistic and co-intuitionistic logic, [3].
14See, for example, [23].
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logic. Furthermore, in [32] (and developed in [13]), it is shown that it is pos-
sible to construct complement-topoi whose internal logic is paraconsistent,
so providing a natural environment for understanding co-intuitionistic logic.
Our analysis of complement topoi builds upon that work. However, un-
like those constructions, we do not attempt to a build these as full mathe-
matical structures with internal, paraconsistent, logic. Instead, we construct
two, dual, topoi representing a symmetric dialogue structure for proofs and
refutations. This is made possible by syntactically decoupling the two logics,
by which we gain constructivity over proofs and refutations, and traction on
“weak” negations expressing the absence of proof (or refutation).15 Then,
by identifying the conditions under which they collapse to a Boolean topos,
we can allow for collapse under controlled conditions, which are just those in
which we have conclusive proofs or refutations (as solutions). Such a system is
capable of non-trivially dealing with the simultaneous consideration of proof
and refutation attempts of the same formula, so retaining constructivism over
proofs and refutations.
1.5. Outline
We begin by introducing in §2 an abstract definition of logic and duality,
before providing algebraic structures for Heyting and co-Heyting algebra. As
we show, these are adequate structures for understanding intuitionist and
co-intuitionist logics, with a duality mapping between the two. Then, §3
briefly provides an overview of how the two logics are understood as co-
constructive over proof and refutation attempts. In §4, a basic categorical
construction for intuitionistic logic is provided, before going on to show that it
collapses in the presence of co-intuitionistic co-implication. Then, §5 provides
an account of dual topoi as dialogue structure over proofs and refutations. We
note several features of these structures in relation to the constructivity of
the internal logics, before introducing a specific relationship between them,
called coherence. Coherence accounts for the conditions under which they
collapse to a Boolean topos. §6 finishes by discussing the three resultant
topos-theoretic structures and proof-theoretic semantics.
2. Logic and algebraic duality
First, we provide a generalised and suitably abstract definition of a “logic”,
which we will think of as a structure of entailment, since we are primarily
interested in a proof-theoretic account.16
Definition 2.1. Say that a “logic”, L, is an entailment structure, which is an
ordered pair, (S, L ), where S is a denumerable set of propositional formulas,
and L is a binary entailment relation defined on P (S)×P (S) (P (S) is the set
of all finite subsets of S), which we call normal when L is reflexive, transitive,
monotonic and finitary.
15These are similar to the familiar concept of “negation as failure”.
16See [48] for a similar definition.
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An entailment structure defined this way is just a just a pre-order where
the ordering relation ≤ on S is equivalent to L (i.e. α ≤ β ⇔ α L β).17
Entailment structures can be restricted in different ways, which we shall think
of in terms of sequents in a logic.
Definition 2.2. A sequent is just an ordered pair, 〈Γ,∆〉 where Γ,∆ are finite
(possibly empty) sequences of formulas of S. Say that a right-asymmetric
sequent (Γ, α) is restricted to at most a single formula on the right; a left-
asymmetric sequent (α,Γ) is restricted to at most a single formula on the
left, and a symmetric sequent (Γ,∆) has no such restrictions. A sequent rule
R in any logic L is an ordered pair consisting of a finite sequence of sequent
premises and a sequent conclusion R = 〈{SEQP} , SEQC〉, and, in case the
list of premises is empty, the instance of a rule is called an axiom.
In this way, we may think of a specific logic to be determined by a proof
structure (set of axioms and sequent rules), where any collection of sequents
S that is closed under standard structural rules determines a finitary, normal,
logic. For example, it is the case that Γ α iff for some finite Γ0 ⊆ Γ, we
have (Γ0 α) ∈ S.18
Now, consider the construction of formulas in the languages for the two
logics that we are primarily interested in here, intuitionistic logic LI , which
I take to deal with proofs, and LC for co-intuitionistic logic, which I take to
deal with refutations.
Definition 2.3. Define two languages S, Sd over a denumerable set of atomic
formulas, for LI and LC respectively, in Backus-Naur form (α
+ is any atomic
formula of S, α− is any atomic formula of Sd):19
(S) β+ ::= α+|¬Iβ+|β+ ∧ β+|β+ ∨ β+|β+ ⇒ β+|0+
(Sd) β− ::= α−|¬Cβ−|β− ∧ β−|β− ∨ β−|β− ⇐ β−|1−
Here, ¬I and ¬C denote the negations of the two languages, and⇒ and
⇐ denote implication and co-implication, respectively. These are the key dis-
tinctions with classical logic, though as I show below, ⇐ essentially operates
as a kind of “implication for refutations”.20 Note also that we have made a
17The definition is necessarily abstract, there will be many further constraints on the
structure in any specific logic. It is also worth noting that (S,≤) will be a poset in case ≤
is also anti-symmetric, which is the case if we take the skeleton of the pre-order and the
construct ≤ from the set of equivalence classes of S under logical equivalence (α ≡ β ↔
α ≤ β and β ≤ α). This may capture the idea that in propositional logic we may say that
non-identical formulas e.g. α, α ∨ α have the same “inferential force” [p.158]Restall2000-
RESAIT.
18For symmetric sequents, this is Γ ∆ iff for some finite Γ0 ⊆ Γ, ∆0 ⊆ ∆ we have
(Γ0 ∆0) ∈ S. See also [20, p.113]. Note that I use rather than typical for symmetric
sequents to highlight that they can be read in both directions.
19For the most part, I shall drop the superscripts where they are obvious from context.
20Though see [16, 37, 52] for alternative interpretations of⇐. Note also that both ¬C and
⇐ can, however, be defined inside classical logic, in which case the duality mapping given
below can be easily transformed into a full self-duality for classical logic, with ⇐ dual to
⇒, and ¬I and ¬C collapsing together. We should also note that an alternative usage of
⇐ for a second implication exists in [6].
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syntactic distinction between atoms of the two languages, to signify whether
they are part of a proof or a refutation, and to control their interaction.
It is well known that the posetal structure of any intuitionist proposi-
tional logic is equivalent to a Heyting algebra.
Definition 2.4. (Heyting algebra) Let (H,≤) be a partial order with the fol-
lowing properties:21
Minimal element 0, such that, for all α, 0 ≤ α;
Maximal element 1, such that, for all α, α ≤ 1;
α ∧ β ≤ α;
α ≤ α ∨ β;
(α ∧ β ≤ γ) iff (α ≤ β ⇒ γ)
¬α = (α⇒ 0).
The relationship between a Heyting algebra and intuitionist proposi-
tional logic, LI (with derivability relation denoted I ), is as follows.
22 Ele-
ments of (H,≤) are formulas of S; ≤ interprets I ; an intuitionistic sequent
Γ I α is β1 ∧ ... ∧ βn ≤ α for all βi ∈ Γ; and ∅ I α is interpreted as 1 ≤ α;
α ∨ β = sup(α, β); α ∧ β = inf(α, β). By the definition of implication, we
can rewrite the definition of negation as α ≤ ¬β iff α∧ β = 0. It follows that
α ∧ ¬α = 0, though it may not be the case that α ∨ ¬α = 1, or α = ¬¬α.
It is a further property of implication that we have the familiar rule modus
ponens so that (β ⇒ γ) ∧ β ≤ γ. Then, the posetal structure of a Heyting
algebra is equivalent to the logical poset for intuitionist logic, as defined by
its typical sequent calculus LJ .
For any poset L, it is simple to define its dual.
Theorem 2.5. If L = (S,≤) is a poset, then so is Ld = (S,≤d), where ≤d is
the converse of ≤ such that, for all α, β ∈ S, β ≤d α iff α ≤ β.
Together with the definition of a logic, this gives us that: whenever
α ≤L β, then (α, β) ∈ L ; it follows that (β, α) ∈ Ld , so β ≤Ld α. This
has particular significance in the context of constructing a dual algebra to
Heyting algebra, which is commonly called co-Heyting algebra.23
Definition 2.6. (Co-Heyting algebra) Let (C,≤) be a partial order with the
following properties [16]:
Minimal element 0, such that, for all α, 0 ≤ α;
Maximal element 1, such that, for all α, α ≤ 1;
α ≤ α ∧ β;
α ∨ β ≤ β;
(α ≤ γ ∨ β) iff (α⇐ β ≤ γ)
¬α = 1⇐ α.
21The following is folklore, but further details can be found in [25, p. 50ff].
22What follows, and theorem 4 is well-known, for details see [51].
23Though sometimes it is called a Brouwerian algebra, for example, [16].
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As mentioned above, we are considering the co-intuitionistic logic LC
(hence co-Heyting algebra) as a refutation structure, following the direction
of [41, 44, 45].24 A valid sequent “α β” of a logic is ordinarily interpreted
as saying that, under the assumption that there exists a proof of α, there
exists a proof of β also. But, this interpretation is not forced upon us, and
we should notice this is an argument in the form of a conditional.25 Say,
instead that we are inclined to assume that β is refuted, then “α β”
may be interpreted as saying that there exists a refutation of α, under that
assumption.26 Since intuitionistic logic is a “positive” logic that is interested
in the providing of proofs, we can read an intuitionistic sequent in right-
asymmetric form Γ I α is that, whenever there is a proof of Γ, there is also
a proof of α (in intuitionistic logic). The co-intuitionistic dual to a right-
asymmetric sequent (Γ α) is a left-asymmetric sequent (α Γ) [52], but,
we are interpreting co-intuitionism as a “negative” logic that is interested
in the providing of refutations, so we are reading the latter as a refutation
read from right to left.27 As such, we shall reverse the turnstile so, that the
meaning of a co-intuitionistic sequent of the form Γ C α is that, under the
assumption that Γ is refuted, α is refuted also. Just as ∅ I α indicates that
α is a theorem of an intuitionistic proof-theory, ∅ C α indicates that α is
a “counter-theorem” of a co-intuitionistic refutation-theory. It is important
to note that the notion of refutation at work here should not definable by
means of negation of a proof, since it is both symmetric, and on a par, with
the latter, so, in general, α C β 6= ¬Iα I ¬Iβ.
We can think of this in terms of two, dual, posets, with positive entail-
ment, where α β; and negative entailment, where β α. In general, the
former considers whether a proof of α entails a proof of β, and the latter,
whether a refutation of β entails a refutation of α.
Definition 2.7. (Positive and negative entailment) Say that α positively en-
tails β whenever α β, so that α ≤+ β). Say that α negatively entails β
whenever α β, so that α ≤− β.
In the following, we consider co-intuitionistic logic by means of negative
entailment, or refutation.
In this setting, the relationship between a co-Heyting algebra and co-
intuitionistic propositional logic is as follows. Elements of (C,≤) are formulas
of Sd; ≤ interprets C ; a sequent Γ C α is α ≤ β1∨ ...∨βn for all βi ∈ Γ; and
∅ I α is interpreted as α ≤ 0; α ∨ β = inf(α, β); α ∧ β = sup(α, β). By the
24Though note that refuted is here inequivalent with non-valid as Skura [41] has it.
25As pointed out in [38].
26Or if you prefer to think in terms of truth, then roughly, if α β is interpreted as saying
that, if α is true, then β is true also, then α β is interpreted as saying that, if α is false,
then β is false also.
27One reason for this interpretation is that it is “natural” in the sense that there is no
decent implication operator in LC , but there is a decent co-implication operator that
strings together refuted formulas and obeys a dual-deduction theorem, as discussed in §5.
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definition of co-implication, we can rewrite negation as ¬β ≤ α iff (α∨β) = 1.
So, α∨¬α = 1, but α∧¬α = 0 need not hold, nor ¬¬α = α. So, the posetal
structure of a co-Heyting algebra is equivalent to the logical poset for co-
intuitionist logic, LC , as defined by the following proof-theoretic rules.
Definition 2.8. (Sequent calculus for co-intuitionistic logic of refutation [52,
49]):28
α C α
∆ C (Weak-R)
∆ C α
∆ C β (Weak-L)
∆, α C β
∆, α, α C β (Cont)
∆, α C β
∆, α, σ,Θ C β (Exchange)
∆, σ, α,Θ C β
∆, α C β Γ C α (Cut)
∆,Γ C β
∆ C α (∧R1)
∆ C α ∧ β
∆ C β (∧R2)
∆ C α ∧ β
∆, α C σ ∆, β C σ (∧L)
∆, α ∧ β C σ
∆ C α ∆ C β (∨R)
∆ C α ∨ β
∆, α C σ (∨L1)
∆, α ∨ β C σ
∆, β C σ (∨L2)
∆, α ∨ β C σ
∆, β C α (⇐ R)
∆ C α⇐ β
∆, α C σ Γ C β (⇐ L)
∆,Γ, α⇐ β C σ
∆, α C (¬CR)
∆ C ¬Cα
∆ C α (¬CL)
∆,¬Cα C
The duality relationship between the two structures is now much more
simple to grasp. In general, the duality between Heyting and co-Heyting alge-
bra is achieved by replacing any use of ∧,∨,⇒,¬, 1, 0 in Heyting algebra, with
28I drop superscripts throughout.
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∨,∧,⇐,¬, 0, 1 in co-Heyting algebra. More formally, we take the dualizing
map (−)⊥ between S and Sd as follows.
Definition 2.9. (Dualizing map ((−)⊥) := LI 7→ LC) [e.g.][]Urbas1996-
IGODL by induction on formulas):
α+⊥ := α− for atomic α
(α ∧ β)⊥ := α⊥ ∨ β⊥
(α ∨ β)⊥ := α⊥ ∧ β⊥
(¬Iα)⊥ := ¬C(α)⊥
(α⇒ β)⊥ := β⊥ ⇐ α⊥
{α1...αn}⊥ :=
{
α⊥1 ...α
⊥
n
}
We also stipulate that (α⊥)⊥ := α, so the mapping is easily extended to Sd.
3. Co-constructive logic
Before we examine categorical constructions for intuitionistic and co-
intuitionistic logics, let us briefly consider how these are interpreted in co-
constructive logic.29
It is possible to interpret LI and LC as separate structures in which, be-
ginning with a sequent, rules are repeatedly applied until axioms are reached.
However, this is not quite what we have in mind here. Rather, the idea is to
think of the construction of a proof (refutation) as a process of argumentation
that is characterised in a formal dialogue between the two entailment struc-
tures. In brief, we will consider a dialogue in the above structure in terms of
a relationship between proof attempts and refutation attempts that
are “tests” of each other. Think of “prover” as making an attempt to pro-
vide a proof for some statement on the basis of a set of assumptions. We call
this a proof-attempt, which informally is a sequence of arguments that is
utilized by “prover” to suggest that, given a set of (assumed) premises, the
final formula is provable. The success of a proof attempt, therefore, depends
upon the existence of a proof for each assumption, and at each step of the
argument. From the point of view of “refuter”, the statement is deemed to
be currently unrefuted, and refuter makes attempt to provide a refutation
for that statement, on the basis of a set of counter-assumptions. We can call
this a refutation-attempt, which, informally, is a sequence of arguments
that can be utilized by “refuter” to suggest that, given a set of (assumed
deniable) premises, the final formula is refutable. The success of a refuta-
tion attempt, therefore, depends upon the existence of a refutation for each
counter-assumption, and at each step of the argument.
For example, take the following interaction. “Prover” asserts a conjunc-
tion, α∧β, so it is incumbent upon prover, to provide a proof attempt giving
some sort of reason or evidence in support of both α and β. Refuter, on the
other hand, challenges α ∧ β by providing a refutation attempt giving some
sort of reason or evidence refuting either α or β. Exactly the reverse is the
29Further details are in [49].
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case if the formula in question is a disjunction. So, we can interpret the re-
lationship between LI and LC in terms of tests, where a test of α
+ is just
a refutation-attempt of form α−, and a test of α− is just a proof-attempt of
form α+:
• Testing α+ ∧ β+ involves testing α+ or testing β+.
• Testing α+ ∨ β+ involves testing α+ and testing β+.
• Testing α− ∧ β− involves testing α− and testing β−.
• Testing α− ∨ β− involves testing α− or testing β−.
• Testing α+ ⇒ β+ involves testing for a function that maps each test of
α+ into a test of β+.
• Testing β− ⇐ α− involves testing for a function that maps each test of
α− into a test of β−.
In order that these tests do not simply collapse together, there must be
no restriction upon simultaneous proof and refutation attempts of the same
formula α, bearing in mind that there is a syntactic distinction between α+
in LI , and α
− in LC , which we are interpreting as saying that α is being
played by “prover”, and by “refuter”, respectively. This syntactic separation
is, therefore, non-arbitrary in the sense that it reflects distinct uses for the
two logics as structures for proofs and refutations, respectively, which has the
effect that the resultant structure can be understood as a symmetric logic,
capable of non-trivially dealing with the simultaneous consideration of proof
and refutation attempts. This does not mean that we allow “contradictions”
of the form α+∧α−, since α+ and α− exist in separate structures. Rather, we
allow for the simultaneous existence of a potential proof of α+ and refutation
of α− without also allowing for “direct” contradiction. In addition we have
two, more standard, notions of negation defined in terms of implication and
co-implication, respectively:
• ¬Iα↔ α⇒ 0
• ¬Cα↔ 1⇐ α.
But, in distinction to a typical understanding of negation, and since
we already have direct proof (in LI) and direct refutation (in LC) available,
these will be interpreted as “weak negations” which, attached to a formula
α, expresses the idea that an attempted proof (refutation) of α “does not
go through”.30 So, ¬Iα corresponds to the assumption of α leading to a
non-proof, and so returns an unproved conjecture; and ¬Cα corresponds to
the assumption of α leading to a “non-refutation”, so similarly returning an
unrefuted conjecture. These weaker than typical negation operators allow
that α remains an open problem, and so we can make sense of the status of
conjectures that are under consideration, whilst also allowing that a proof-
or refutation-attempt fails. Weakly-negated formulas obviously fail typical
monotonicity conditions, but as [46, §2.4] point out, adding such an operator
to standard intuitionistic logic would be conservative since its existence has
no impact on the usual interpretation of all other connectives. The same is
30This is similar to the empirical negation discussed in [8, 46].
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true for co-intuitionistic logic (as structure of refutation), as can easily be
checked. As such, these can be expressed in the following BHK-style clauses:
• c is a proof attempt of ¬α if c is a proof attempt of α such that
c does not go through .
• c is a refutation attempt of ¬α if c is a refutation attempt of α such that
c does not go through .
So, standard characterisations of negation in LI and LC mark the that
a proof or refutation attempt has not been successful, but this does not bring
with it a refutation, or proof, in the dual logical structure.
Whilst this provides something like an informal interpretation of the
relationship between the two structures, we may rightly ask how to formalise
proofs and refutations that are not merely attempts, but that have “passed”
the relevant tests, and have been conclusively established. So, in addition to
proof and refutation attempts, it is also the case that certain proofs and refu-
tations may be conclusive.31 It is natural to take a conclusive proof (refuta-
tion) to mark the end-point of a questioning process: “is α provable?” (in LI),
“is α refutable?” (in LC). At this end-point, we have a conclusive result to
the process of dialogue, and which puts an end to all possible doubts regard-
ing α. Furthermore, and in distinction with proof and refutation attempts,
it seems correct to say that the kind of things that have been conclusively
proved, or conclusively refuted, are established true or established false.
That is, whilst a conjecture is not the sort of thing that we want to say is
true or false, at the end of the process of inquiry, and we have a conclusive
proof (refutation) of α, which we may then consider to be a true, or false,
proposition. This is simply an extension of the intuitionistic proposal that a
proposition is identified with its set of proofs. Here, a proposition is identified
with its set of conclusive proofs or refutations. Then, for a proposition, α,
we should be able to say of α that it “holds”, that α is true (false), and so
on. So, we can think of a proposition as a conclusive solution, which termi-
nates attempts to answer that conjecture. I will assume that the distinction
between, for example, proof attempts and conclusive proof is not simply a
matter of “logic”, following Hintikka [19], for example. Nonetheless, it seems
correct to say that, once α is refuted conclusively, it can not be proved; once
α is proved conclusively, it can not be refuted.
4. Collapse and cartesian closed categories
An immediately apparent issue concerns how we are to construe the exact
formal relationship between the two structures, aside from noting their du-
ality. It is simplest to see where this is problematic from the point of view
of adding an operator equivalent to ⇐ to a Cartesian closed category. This
is also useful as preliminary structure for understanding the construction of
topoi in the following section.
31The notion of a “conclusive defense” is discussed in [21].
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Definition 4.1. (Cartesian closed category (CCC)) A CCC is a category CH
with a terminal object, finite products and exponentials such that, for every
object A of CH, the functor −×A : CH → CH has a right adjoint [1, 24].
Let us briefly define initial and terminal objects in CH.
Definition 4.2. An object 1 is terminal in CH if, for any object A of CH, there
is a unique arrow 2A : A → 1. An object 0 is initial if for any object A of
CH, there is a unique arrow ◦A : 0→ A.
We can also define exponentials as follows:
Definition 4.3. (Exponential) An exponential of objects A and B, denoted
BA, is defined by the arrow ∈A,B : BA ×A→ B which satisfies the following
property: for any object C, and any arrow f : C ×A→ B, there is a unique
arrow g : C → BA as in the following diagram:
C ×A f //
g×idA

B
BA ×A
∈A,B
;;
The arrow ∈A,B is usually called evaluation.
If we allow that, in CH we also have finite co-products and initial ob-
ject, then we have a Heyting algebra as a category. As such, it is possible to
interpret intuitionistic calculus in CH much as above. Objects of CH interpret
formulas α, β; morphisms f : A→ B model proof attempts α I β; composi-
tion models cut; products model conjunction; co-products model disjunction;
initial and terminal objects are 0, 1 respectively; exponentiation models im-
plication. On the latter, for example, if we allow that BA interprets (α⇒ β)
in an intuitionistic calculus, then it is obvious that the evaluation morphism
is equivalent to modus ponens.
We briefly consider co-products.
Definition 4.4. (Co-product) A co-product of A and B is an object A ⊕ B,
with morphisms:
iA,B : A→ A⊕B;
i′A,B : B → A⊕B;
such that, for any C, and any morphisms f : A → C, and g : B → C,
there is a unique arrow h : A⊕B → C as in the following diagram:
C
A
iA,B
//
f
<<
A⊕B
h
OO
B
i′A,B
oo
g
cc
The morphisms iA,B and i
′
A,B are “injections”, which ensure the dis-
junction property in intuitionistic logic.
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The general idea is to construe morphisms in CH as proofs in LI , and
with 1 understood as “proved” rather than “true” as is commonly the case.
This ensures that the structure can be understood syntactically, so that mor-
phisms such as f : 1→ A interpret theorems of LI .
Consider now what happens when we attempt to add an operator such
as ⇐ to CH . To do so, we introduce co-exponentials into CH by means of
dualizing the above definition, such that every − ⊕ A : CH → CH has left
adjoint. As is obvious, this is equivalent to the definition of co-implication
given for Co-Heyting algebras.
Definition 4.5. (Co-exponential [7]) A co-exponential of objects A and B,
denoted BA, is defined by the arrow 3A,B : B → BA ⊕ A which satisfies the
following property: for any object C, and any arrow f : B → C ⊕A, there is
a unique arrow g : BA → C as in the following diagram:
B
f //
3A,B ##
C ⊕A
BA ⊕A
h⊕idA
OO
Let us note that, as discussed above, the co-exponential (insofar as it
is understood to interpret co-implication) does not suffice as an implication
operator. Nonetheless, it is instructive to consider the morphism 3A,B , which
we call co-evaluation, if we allow BA to interpret (β ⇐ α). Co-evaluation gives
us β ≤ (β ⇐ α) ∨ α.
Of course, this also allows us to construct two negations by means
of exponentials and co-exponentials within CH . In this vein, attempts to
allow LI and LC to “cohabit” in the same structure have been explored
by means of bi-intuitionistic calculi, which include both intuitionistic and
co-intuitionistic negation. Algebraically, these are expressed by bi-Heyting
structures [37] combining Heyting and co-Heyting algebras, which are equiv-
alent to CH with co-exponential. Importantly, Crolard [7] shows that, for
any CCC, if we add co-exponential, it will collapse to a single partial order.
This is related to Joyal’s lemma, which proves any CCC that is self-dual is
a pre-order. Importantly for later, this can be strengthened since, whenever
the self-duality is due to a dualizing object (such as a negation operator),
then the posetal reflection of the preorder will be a Boolean algebra. This is
due to the fact that, whenever a CCC contains exponentials, initial object
is strict (so 0 × 0 ∼= 0). Then, by presence of co-exponentials, we know that
A⊕− : CH → CH has left adjoint, which distributes over product as follows:
A ∼= A ⊕ 0 ∼= A ⊕ (0 × 0) ∼= (A ⊕ 0) × (A ⊕ 0) ∼= A × A, and this entails
that, for any two maps into A (providing they have the same domain) are
equivalent.32
32This follows an informal proof given in correspondence by Peter Johnstone available at:
http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.mathematics.categories/7045, and [7] provides
a formal proof with discussion.
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5. Dual topoi and coherence
To pinpoint the exact mechanisms of collapse both algebraically and logically,
we now construct separate topos-theoretic structures for LI and LC . In doing
so, it will become possible to control collapse to the extent that we can utilize
it in our construction.
A topos can be understood as an extension of a CCC with a subobject
classifier, which means that it is particularly useful for providing a structural
analysis of propositional logics. Following the motivation given in [1], we may
think of a topos as a kind of category consisting of ‘(i) objects with some
arbitrary structure, i.e., with morphisms between them, and (ii) “everything
that can be constructed from these by logical means”’ [1, p.223]. In [32]
(and developed in [13]), it is shown that it is possible to construct topoi
whose internal logical structure is paraconsistent. This is in sharp distinction
with the commonly-held [15, 25] assumption that the internal logic of any
elementary topos is intuitionistic.33 Further still, it is argued in [13] that the
internal logic of a topos is not fully determined by its mathematical structure,
but rather, considered as an abstract structure, a topos can support a variety
of internal logics. We make use of this here, by constructing dual topoi for
proofs and refutations, before identifying the manner in which they collapse
to a Boolean topos so that it may be controlled.
Definition 5.1. (Subobject classifier [25]) In a category C with finite limits,
a subobject classifier is a monic: t : 1 → Ω, where Ω is an object of C, such
that, for every object A and any monic m : S → A in C, there is a unique
arrow θ : A→ Ω which forms the pullback square:
S //
m

1
t

A
θ
// Ω
Then, we call Ω the subobject classifier of C, and θ is the classifying
map of m.
We are now in a position to define a topos.
Definition 5.2. (Topos) A topos T is a category with finite limits and colimits;
exponentials; a subobject classifier. This is equivalent to the simpler definition
that T is a topos whenever T is a category with terminal object, pullbacks,
exponentials, and a subobject classifier. In a topos, a proposition is simply a
morphism 1→ Ω.
33[13] also points out that this has also been taken to provide support for the far stronger
suggestion that the ‘universal, invariant laws of mathematics are those of intuitionistic
logic’, in [2].
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Theorem 5.3. [25, p.198ff] For any topos T , and for any object A in T , the
subobjects of A, ΩA, form a Heyting algebra.34
Proof. We first provide categorial definitions of the standard connectives of a
Heyting algebra in the context of T by means of morphisms of the subobject
classifier.
Conjunction, is defined as the characteristic morphism of 〈t, t〉 : 1 →
Ω× Ω, so that Ω× Ω ∧→ Ω, makes the following a pullback diagram:
1 //
〈t,t〉

1
t

Ω× Ω ∧ // Ω
Disjunction, is defined as the characteristic morphism of [〈t, id〉, 〈id, t〉],
so that Ω× Ω ∨→ Ω, makes the following a pullback diagram:
Ω⊕ Ω //
[〈t,id〉,〈id,t〉]

1
t

Ω× Ω ∨ // Ω
Implication, is defined as the characteristic morphism of e :≤ e→ Ω × Ω
(where ≤ is the partial order formed by the elements of Ω), which is the
equalizer of ∧ and the canonical projection, pi1, on the first component of
the product, i.e. ≤ e→ Ω × Ω∧
pi1
Ω, so that Ω × Ω ⇒→ Ω, makes the following a
pullback diagram:
≤ //
e

1
t

Ω× Ω ⇒ // Ω
Note that this mirrors the fact that in a Heyting algebra, α ≤ β ↔
α ∧ β = α.
Let us define the morphism fT : 1→ Ω by means of the initial object 0
by the following diagram:
0 //

1
t

1
fT
// Ω
34As is typical, we may slightly abuse notation say that a subobject may be a member
of Ω, since this makes little difference in practice (in the context of propositional logic),
though to be more precise we should say that the equivalence class for a subobject is a
member of Ω.
18 James Trafford
Then, negation is defined as the characteristic morphism of fT , so that
Ω
¬→ Ω makes the following a pullback diagram:
1 //
fT

1
t

Ω ¬ // Ω
Then, since Ω×Ω⇒ Ω constructs an exponential object ΩΩ, so we can
define a Heyting algebra by the poset structure of Ω. 
Since propositional intuitionistic logic is equivalent to any Heyting al-
gebra, so it is unsurprising that the same is true in a topos T . We can extend
the translation into Heyting algebra given above, and interpret a formula α
of a formal language, whose set of formulas is S, by means of a topos T , to
be denoted as T |=T α, which says that α is equivalent to the morphism t in
T .35 Similarly, α |=T β says that whenever α is equivalent to the morphism
t in T , so too is β.36
Theorem 5.4. For any topos T and proposition α, T |= α whenever I α.
Proof. By the fact that Ω is a Heyting algebra, and given in [25]. 
Of course, every Boolean algebra is also a Heyting algebra when each
element, α of a Heyting algebra is complemented so that ¬¬α = α. In the
topos-theoretic setting, we will say that a topos TB is Boolean whenever Ω
forms a Boolean algebra [25, p.270]. This is the case whenever f is comple-
ment to t, so that the negation operator ¬ : Ω → Ω satisfies ¬¬ = id, and,
by Diaconescu’s theorem, this is also equivalent to a topos having axiom of
choice. As example, the topos SET has a subobject classifier which forms
a Boolean algebra, where the objects of SET are sets, and morphisms are
functions.
Now, consider a topos adequate to a co-Heyting algebra. By analogy
with the relationship between T and intuitionistic logic, we require a topos
with Ω forming a co-Heyting algebra, and by which it is possible to con-
struct an interpretation of co-intuitionistic logic as logic of refutation. The
key distinction between the approach suggested here, and the construction
in [12, 13, 32] is that, in the latter, a paraconsistent topos is understood as a
complete mathematical universe, which is, at the least, capable of expressing
a “full” propositional logic. Here, we take an ordinary topos and a paracon-
sistent topos to express two “halves” of a logic, with the former dealing with
proof attempts, and the latter, refutation attempts.37 This allows us to deal
35Bear in mind that under this interpretation, t does not represent “truth”, but “potential
proof”.
36This follows the account given in [1].
37It may seem odd to allow intuitionistic logic to range over proofs only, but, as [40] points
out, it is incapable of dealing with refutation in any case.
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with complications that can they can not, such as the fact that a paracon-
sistent topos (and logic in general) is incapable of expressing a detachable
implication operator for proofs.
As pointed out in [13], there is little reason to interpret the morphism
t as indicating “truth”, or “proof” as ordinarily is the case, and such an
interpretation is a matter of external decision, which is to say that it is not
forced upon us by the internal language of a standard topos. So, whilst the
construction of a paraconsistent topos may be seen by some as a simple
matter of relabelling, this will have significant impact upon the structure of
the propositional logic that we interpret in it. For example, the process of
constructing a complement topos begins with the subobject classifier, which is
renamed “complement classifier”, which, as such, is a is a different generalized
element than t : 1→ Ω in T .
Definition 5.5. (Complement classifier [12, 13, 32]) In a category TC with
terminal object 1, a complement classifier is a monic: f : 1→ Ω, where Ω is
an object of TC , such that, for every object A and any monic m : S → A in
TC , there is a unique arrow σ : A→ Ω which forms the pullback square:
S //
m

1
f

A
σ
// Ω
Then, we call Ω the complement classifier of C, and σ is the classifying
map of m.
Definition 5.6. (Complement topos [12, 13, 32]) A complement topos TC is a
category with finite limits and colimits; exponentials; a complement classifier.
This is equivalent to the simpler definition that TC is a complement topos
whenever TC is a category with terminal object, pullbacks, exponentials, and
a complement classifier. In a complement topos, a (refutation) proposition is
a morphism 1→ Ω.
Theorem 5.7. [12, 13, 32] For any complement topos TC , and for any object
A in TC , the subobjects of A, Ω
A, form a co-Heyting algebra.
Proof. We first provide categorial definitions of the standard connectives of
a co-Heyting algebra in the context of TC by means of morphisms of the
subobject classifier. Conjunction, is defined as the characteristic morphism
of [〈f, id〉, 〈id, f〉], so that Ω×Ω ∧→ Ω, makes the following a pullback diagram:
Ω⊕ Ω //
[〈f,id〉,〈id,f〉]

1
f

Ω× Ω ∧ // Ω
Disjunction, is defined as the characteristic morphism of 〈f, f〉 : 1 →
Ω× Ω, so that Ω× Ω ∨→ Ω, makes the following a pullback diagram:
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1 //
〈f,f〉

1
f

Ω× Ω ∨ // Ω
Co-implication is defined as the characteristic morphism of e :≥ e→ Ω×Ω,
which is the equalizer of ∨ and the canonical projection, pi1, on the first
component, i.e. ≥ e→ Ω × Ω∨
pi1
Ω, so that Ω × Ω ⇐→ Ω, makes the following a
pullback diagram:
≥ //
e

1
f

Ω× Ω ⇐ // Ω
Note that this mirrors the fact that in a co-Heyting algebra, α ≥ β ↔
β ∨ α = β.
Let us define the morphism tTC : 1 → Ω by means of the initial object
0 by the following diagram:
0 //

1
f

1
tTC
// Ω
Then, negation is defined as the characteristic morphism of tTC , so that
Ω
¬→ Ω makes the following a pullback diagram:
1 //
tTC

1
f

Ω ¬ // Ω
Then, since Ω × Ω ⇒ Ω constructs an exponential object ΩΩ, we can
define a co-Heyting algebra by the poset structure of Ω. 
Since propositional co-intuitionistic logic is equivalent to a co-Heyting
algebra, it is unsurprising that the same is true in TC . We can extend the
translation into co-Heyting algebra given above, and interpret a formula α of
a formal language, whose set of formulas is S, by means of TC , to be denoted
as TC |=TC α, which says that α is equivalent to the morphism f in TC .38
Similarly, α |=TC β says that whenever α is equivalent to the morphism f in
TC , so too is β.
39
38As above, bear in mind that f does not represent “falsity”, but “proof attempt”.
39This follows the account given in [1].
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Theorem 5.8. For any complement topos TC and proposition α, TC |=TC α
whenever C α.
Proof. By the fact that Ω is a co-Heyting algebra, and by duality with the
proof for Heyting algebra and ordinary topos [12]. 
As is obvious, a complement topos is a natural structure for articulating
co-intuitionistic logic as a logic of refutation, just as a topos is a natural
structure for articulating intuitionistic as a logic of proof. For example, the
following two properties hold in the respective topoi.
Corollary 5.9. The disjunction property holds in T [15]; the conjunction prop-
erty holds in TC .
Proof. In Intuitionistic logic, we have the disjunction property: I α∨β iff I
α or I β; in co-Intuitionistic logic (as refutation) we have the conjunction
property: C α ∧ β iff C α or C β. In the topoi as defined above, these
hold by definition of disjunction in T and conjunction in TC , respectively.
Whenever α∨β is equivalent to the morphism t in T , then so is the morphism
α or the morphism β. Whenever α ∧ β is equivalent to the morphism f in
TC , then so is the morphism α or the morphism β. 
As is typically the case, the intuitionistic disjunction property is con-
nected to its constructive nature, since law of excluded middle is not a theo-
rem. This is mirrored in co-intuitionistic logic, as constructive logic of refuta-
tion, where law of non-contradiction is not a theorem. Moreover, just as the
simultaneous proof of α and ¬α in LI would trivialize the logic such that it
is possible to prove any formula, so the simultaneous refutation of α and ¬α
in LC would trivialize the logic such that it is possible to refute any formula.
In fact, these follow from the typical conditions on initial objects, which, if
interpreted as “non-proved” in T , says that from “non-proved” everything
follows; if interpreted as “non-refuted” in TC , says that from “non-refuted”
everything follows.
Corollary 5.10. Intuitionistically, implication is an operator for which deduc-
tion theorem holds, such that α I β ↔ I α ⇒ β. In co-intuitionistic logic,
co-implication is an operator for which dual-deduction theorem holds, such
that α C β ↔ C β ⇐ α. Both of these are the case in T and TC (respec-
tively), by definition.
As shown by Goodman [16], it is not possible to define an operator in LC
by means of ∧,∨,¬,⇐ that obeys deduction theorem. Furthermore, whilst
⇐ will not satisfy modus ponens, it is simple to derive the dual, refutation,
form of modus ponens:
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[ass.]
C α⇐ β
[ass.]
C β
[Identity]
α C α (⇐ L)
α⇐ β C α (Cut)
C α
If we were interested in LC (and TC) as a construction ranging over
proofs, then the lack of a definable operator for which deduction theorem
holds would be problematic, since it would suggest that such a logic is in-
capable of defining a decent implication.40 The reason that it is impossible
to define the respective operators inside the opposite structure is obviously
connected with the collapse to a preorder when co-exponential is added to
CCC. But, in this context, we can go further still, and show that, any at-
tempt to construct a topos whose internal logic supports both intuitionistic
and co-intuitionistic logic will collapse to a topos with Boolean algebra such
as SET . Consider this in terms of the logical structure first.
Theorem 5.11. Any attempt to extend LI with an operator for which dual-
deduction theorem holds, or LC with an operator for which deduction theorem
holds is impossible.41
Proof. We consider LI only (the proof for LC is analogous). Say that we
attempt to add an operator,⇐, for which dual deduction theorem holds in LI ,
so that α I β ↔ β ⇐ α I . We take as assumption (since it is well-known),
that the counter-theorems of LI are equivalent to the counter-theorems of
classical logic, and that ⇐ is definable classically as (α ⇐ β) := (α ∧ ¬β).
Since we have α α both classically and in LI , we also have α ⇐ α in
both. Classically, we can rewrite any α with its double negation, so, there, we
have ¬¬α ⇐ α (and in LI by the assumption above). Therefore, we can
derive ¬¬α α in both, which is not possible in LI . The reverse is easily
proved for LC+⇒.42 
The problems arise whenever we attempt to put together the calculi
whilst also requiring that deduction and dual-deduction theorem hold. For
example, it is possible to formulate deduction and dual-deduction theorems
in rule-form and add them to either LI and LC , so that we have the following:
for any α, β, if there exists a derivation of I β, which is either an axiom or
40The point is arguable. For example, [12] discusses the suggestion in [32] that, in fact,
this is not a problematic deficiency since mathematics depends less on an object-language
implication operator, than it does a deducibility relation, which can be constructed in
terms of the ordering on the complement classifier. I will not take a stance on this here,
since the current construction does not require such an operator.
41A similar proof is given in [52]
42It is possible to simply add to LC a kind of implication (or co-implication to LI) connec-
tive [52]. But, neither modus ponens nor deduction theorem will unrestrictedly hold for it,
and we lose constructivity in the form of disjunction property for positive entailment and
conjunction property for negative entailment (there is also no way to do so conservatively
for first-order logic).
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a sequent of the form I α, then α I β; if there exists a derivation of C β,
which is either an axiom or a sequent of the form C α, then α C β. But,
it is difficult, then, to prevent classical logic following closely behind, since
in standard settings this makes it possible to derive both double negation
introduction and elimination (as discussed in [7]).43
Nonetheless, whilst it is certainly possible, if tricky, for intuitionis-
tic and co-intuitionistic logic to be supported within the same structure,
both logically, and algebraically, this is not the case for topos-theoretic
interpretations.[37] provides an overview of bi-Heyting algebras. For example,
it is not possible for a standard topos T with Ω forming a Heyting algebra to
also have Ω form a co-Heyting algebra unless the algebra formed is Boolean.
Lemma 5.12. In a topos T , the characteristic morphism of 0 → 1 is fT :
1 → Ω; in a complement topos TC , the characteristic morphism of 0 → 1
is tTC : 1 → Ω. Whenever a topos T also has a complement classifier such
that both t : 1 → Ω and f : 1 → Ω classify, then T is Boolean. Whenever
a complement topos TC also has a classifier such that both f : 1 → Ω and
t : 1→ Ω classify, then TC is Boolean.
Above, we defined a Boolean topos, TB whenever Ω forms a Boolean
algebra, which is the case whenever ¬¬ = id; equally, this is the case whenever
¬f = t and ¬t = f , so, for any α ¬¬α = α. Equivalently, in any topos T , 1⊕1
is definable by presence of co-product, and, by definition t, f : 1→ Ω, so we
have 1⊕1→ Ω. Whenever the latter morphism is an isomorphism, the topos
T is Boolean since every proposition α in T is equivalent with either t or f .
The above lemma is equivalent to saying that the topos forms subobjects with
Heyting algebra for provability, and co-Heyting for refutability. Letting ft = f
(in TC), and tTC = t (in T ), we know by respective definitions of negation
that both α ≤ ¬¬α and ¬¬α ≤ α, by which it follows that α = ¬¬α for
every α. In other words, whenever ¬α is equivalent to the morphism t, then
α is equivalent to the morphism f , and vice-versa, so we have ¬¬ = id.44
43[17] constructs a combined logic using a display calculus, which is capable of dealing
with both proofs and refutations on a par. In order for cut-elimination, however, it must
be possible to trace the direction (positive or negative) of entailment, and so there is a
metalogical decision that, for any sequent, its direction must go in one of the two ways.
Consider also the metalogical relationship between LI and LC . By duality, we know that
(co-)theorematically, whenever it is the case that I α, it is also the case that C α,
so that LC is something like the metalogical negation of the system LI . This leads us to
suppose that, for any α, either α is proved in LI , or its dual is refuted in LC , which is just a
metalogical form law of non-contradiction. It is also worth pointing out that any symmetric
calculus also requires restrictions that reflect the restriction to single succedents for positive
entailment, and single antecedents for negative entailment, since if the deduction theorem
is not so restricted, it is simple to derive excluded middle as theorem (from α ⇒ 0 I
¬α, derive I α,¬α, and then use the right disjunction rule). This is tricky to achieve
(particularly in a non-arbitrary way), since it wreaks havoc with structural rules.
44For example, [12] points out that in effect, SET , therefore always has both classifiers.
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Since the internal logic of a topos is defined by the algebra that is formed
by Ω, the internal logic of a Boolean topos is classical [15, ch.7]. This gives
us the following corollary:
Corollary 5.13. In a topos-theoretic setting, LI and LC can not co-habit, since
any attempt to combine LI and LC (or T and TC) will collapse to classical
logic (or Boolean topos).
6. Harnessing collapse for dialogue between proofs and
refutations
In order to prevent the automatic collapse of T and TC to a Boolean topos,
we have syntactically separated the two structures, distinguishing the objects
from which they are built.45 This has the consequence that certain “formulas”
are barred. For example, ¬Iα− and ¬Cα+ are not wff ’s, and so neither is
¬I¬Cα+,−. So, it is possible that proof attempts exist neither for α nor ¬Iα;
and that refutation attempts exist neither for α⊥ nor ¬Cα⊥. Nor is there
any restriction on the simultaneous consideration of proof and refutation
attempts as discussed above. As such, there is nothing in the above topoi T
and TC , that requires the following to hold in general:
• T |=T α+ or TC |=TC α
−
• T 6|=T α+ or TC 6|=TC α−
From the above discussion, we also say that once a formula α− is refuted
conclusively, then α+ can not be proved; once α+ is proved conclusively, α−
can not be refuted. This gives us a distinction between proof and refutation
attempts, and conclusively proved (refuted) formulas that we can make use
of here.
In a typical constructive logic such as LI , we say that a formula α is
decidable iff α ∨ ¬α holds for α; we say that a formula α is stable iff ¬¬α
implies α. Neither of these is a theorem of LI , though they hold in certain
contexts. By analogy with this, in the current structure we shall say that a
formula α is determined whenever there exists a conclusive proof of α+, or a
conclusive refutation of α−. Moreover, as in the interpretation given in §3, it
seems appropriate to say that some α for which we have a conclusive proof
(refutation), that it holds true (false).46 What is important about the set of
formulas for which a conclusive proof or refutation exists is that we are then in
a position to know : the proof of α+ rules out any further refutation attempts
of α−; or the refutation of α− rules out any further proof attempts of α+.
As such, over these (and only these formulas), it becomes possible to define
an external relationship between formulas of S and Sd by means of a kind of
metalinguistic negation operation, since, if, for some α+,−, α+ is conclusively
45Whilst differing in both interpretation and formalization, a similar technique is suggested
in [4, 31].
46Take, for example, a domain concerning rationality such as scientific reasoning or ar-
gumentation. There, it is not uncommon to have reason (or some evidence) to consider
potential proofs of α, whilst also attempting to “test” α as defined above.
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proved, then α− is not conclusively refuted; if α− is conclusively refuted, then
α+ is not conclusively proved. As such, we can define the following external
negation between LI and LC :
Definition 6.1. For all and only those formulas of S and Sd which are con-
clusively proved (in LI) or conclusively refuted (in LC), the following met-
alinguistic negation operation, ∼, to hold between formulas of the logical
structures:
• ∼ α+ := α−
• ∼ α− := α+
• ∼∼ α+,− = α−,+
Since ∼ is an external negation, it negates a formula as a whole, rather
than some component of that formula. So, here, it carries the simple meaning
that, for example, ∼ (α+ ∧ β+) is equivalent to (α− ∧ β−). In English, this
just says that, whenever there exists a conclusive refutation of “α and β”, we
also know that there can not exist a conclusive proof of “α and β”.
We can then use ∼ to simulate a metalinguistic (i.e. external) relation-
ship between the topos-theoretic structures introduced above. Let us call this
relationship coherence:
Definition 6.2. Say that T and TC are coherent iff it is the case that whenever
T |=T α then TC 6|=TC α, and whenever TC |=TC α then T 6|=T α, and, for
every α, either T |=T α or TC |=TC α, and either T 6|=T α or TC 6|=TC α. So,
∼ α+ is equivalent to saying that whenever TC |=TC α then T 6|=T α; ∼ α−
is equivalent to saying that whenever T |=T α then TC 6|=TC α, so the above
clauses defining ∼ hold for coherent elements of T and TC .
It is simple to see from the above, and by the fact that ∼∼= id, that
it is possible to construct a topos (TB) containing only determined formulas,
with ∼ f = t and ∼ t = f , so, for any α, ∼∼ α = α. In other words, the
following holds:
Corollary 6.3. Whenever T and TC are coherent, they can be represented by
a Boolean topos TB.
This also means that the internal logic of a Boolean topos (i.e. classical
logic), can be simulated by considering T alongside TC , but only when they
are in a relationship of coherence. In addition, we also have the result that,
for all and only those formulas which are conclusively proved (in LI) or
conclusively refuted (in LC), they may be interpreted in a Boolean topos
such that TB |= α or TB |=∼ α for each α.
This is analogous to the well-known result that a double-negation mor-
phism, ∼∼: Ω → Ω, on subobjects of a topos T , defines a closure operation
called a Lawvere-Tierney topology (or double negation topology) on T . Then,
the associated topos of sheaves, T∼∼ ↪→ T that corresponds to the double
negation topology is a Boolean topos (i.e. T∼∼ := TB).47 As such, the topos
47Proofs and further discussion may be found in detail in [26], and are also given by Todd
Trimble here: https://ncatlab.org/nlab/show/Heyting+algebraToBooleanAlgebras.
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of sheaves T∼∼ is a model of classical logic. Here, we are simulating this
construction by taking only those formulas that exist in the dialogue topoi,
T and TC that are conclusively proved (refuted). By the above definition of
coherence over these formulas, we can then define a double-negation mor-
phism, j =∼∼= Ω→ Ω = id, on the respective subobjects of T and TC such
that the determined subobject J → Ω classified by j includes only the set
of conclusively proved and refuted formulas. The subtopos T∼∼ of T and TC
formed in this way is obviously Boolean by the fact that ∼∼= id.
The machinery of this interpretation may be clarified by means of a
hybrid Kripke-Joyal semantics for presheaf topos, complement topos, and
Boolean topos. For sake of simplicity, let us use the standard Kripke-style
construction of a model, with the distinction being that we have a hybrid
structure combining objects of a Boolean topos with objects of “dialogue”
topoi above them.48 Only objects of a Boolean topos will be counted as
satisfying formulas in the sense that formulas there are given a definite truth-
value, which is retained by persistence (at each stage of the construction of
the relevant subobject). Objects of dialogue topoi, on the other hand, are
self-contained and do not “reach-into” other stages at all, so they represent
a space of dialogue existing prior to the forcing of a definitive truth-value.
So, we shall consider a proposition as a function from stages of reasoning as
represented by an object Ai of a Boolean topos TB .
Definition 6.4. Take the two languages S and Sd, with the three topoi, T ,
TC , TB as defined in the previous section.
49 Then, since we are primarily
interested in constructing an interpretation M : S, Sd → TB , we take an
object Ai of TB , α a formula of S, S
d and Ai
ai−→ Xi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, then we call
the morphism ai the generalised element of Xi at stage Ai. We also have,
in addition, interpretations S → T , and Sd → TC , which we will define over
objects Ai of T and TC .
We can then define the forcing relations Ai |=+ α and Ai |=− α, and say
that α positively or negatively holds at stage Ai, respectively, for TB . The
relation Ai |=+ α also holds for T , whilst the relation Ai |=− α holds for TC ,
and these are taken to denote proof and refutation attempts, respectively.
We can also define a poset, ≤, as per usual, over stages S such that ≤ is
transitive and reflexive over S. The idea is that we have “Boolean” stages,
48For an alternative presentation, and for further details of the semantics for an ordinary
topos, T , and Boolean topos, TB , see [26, p.302ff] and also [28, p.783ff], the latter of which
the following definition draws upon.
49We should say something here about the syntax of the Boolean topos TB , which we are
loosely specifying in the following as simply S, Sd. This looseness is not harmful since it
is possible to define all of the syntax of both within a topos whose internal language is
Boolean, and this follows from the collapse result in the previous section. For example, ¬I
is definable by means of ⇒ and 0 as usual, and ¬C by ⇐ and 1, as they were for LI and
LC , respectively. The difference here is that they collapse into each other by the fact that
¬I¬C = id in TB . As such, and due to the (non-formal) interpretation of conclusive proofs
and refutations, it is safe to replace ¬I and ¬C in TB by the single external negation ∼
defined above.
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B ⊆ S which are just those for which a conclusive proof or refutation has been
established. At these (and only these) stages, |=+ and |=− are monotonic for
each Ai ∈ B. In other words, they satisfy the following properties:
If A1 ≤ A2 then ∀α ∈ (B, A1), α ∈ (B, A2); and If A1 ≤ A2 then ∀α ∈
(B, A1), α ∈ (B, A2).
This ensures that, whenever a formula is conclusive proved or refuted it can
be interpreted at a Boolean stage, where that “state” remains at every stage
upstream, so, if A1 |=+ α, then A2 |=+ α; if A1 |=− α, then A2 |=− α. This
is not, however, the case for stages outside of B, i.e. at stages of dialogue
which is not yet terminated such that a formula is conclusively proved, or
conclusively refuted.
For any generalised element Ai
ai−→ Xi of an object Xi in a topos, there
are rules specifying when this generalised element belongs to a subobject of X
defined in terms of the forcing relation at stage Ai. This allows us to consider
proof and refutation attempts at stage Ai in T , TC , whilst also interpret-
ing conclusive proofs and refutations in TB . The clauses defining compound
formulas are as follows, with Boolean stages reaching above themselves by
the monotonicity property. Also, note that Boolean stages do not include the
internal negations of LI and LC , since these are only ever involved in proof
and refutation attempts, but they do include the external negation, ∼, as
defined above, whilst the stages that are non-Boolean do not.
Definition 6.5. (Compound formulas (dropping superscripts throughout)):
S → T :
• [∧]Ai |=+ (α ∧ β) iff Ai |=+ α and Ai |=+ β
• [∨]Ai |=+ (α ∨ β) iff Ai |=+ α or Ai |=+ β
• [⇒]Ai |=+ (α⇒ β) iff Ai |=+ α then Ai |=+ β
• [¬I ]Ai |=+ (¬Iα) iff Ai|=+α
Sd → TC :
• [∧]Ai |=− (α ∧ β) iff Ai |=− α or Ai |=−
• [∨]Ai |=− (α ∨ β) iff Ai |=− α and Ai |=− β
• [⇐]Ai |=− (β ⇐ α) iff Ai |=− α then Ai |=− β
• [¬C ]Ai |=− (¬Cα) iff Ai|=−α
S, Sd → TB
• [∧]Ai |=+ (α ∧ β) iff Ai |=+ α and Ai |=+ β
• [∧]Ai |=− (α ∧ β) iff Ai |=− α or Ai |=−
• [∨]Ai |=+ (α ∨ β) iff Ai |=+ α or Ai |=+ β
• [∨]Ai |=− (α ∨ β) iff Ai |=− α and Ai |=− β
• [⇒]Ai |=+ (α⇒ β) iff ∀A′i and Ai ≤ A′i, if A′i |=+ α then A′i |=+ β
• [⇐]Ai |=− (β ⇐ α) iff ∀A′i and Ai ≤ A′i, if A′i |=− α then A′i |=− β
• [∼]For all Ai ∈ B, Ai |=+ α iff Ai |=−∼ α
• [∼]For all Ai ∈ B, Ai |=− α iff Ai |=+∼ α
Definition 6.6. (Satisfaction) We say that a modelM satisfies α positively or
negatively, (M |=+ α or M |=− α respectively) iff Bi |=+ α for every B ∈ B
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or Bi |=− α for every B ∈ B, respectively. Whenever a formula is satisfied
positively or negatively, it is called true or false, respectively. A formula is
called conclusively proved or refuted iff it is satisfied in all models.
In other words, satisfaction at a single Boolean stage implies satisfac-
tion at all stages occurring before it, and so conclusive proof and refutation
is equivalent to being forced at all Boolean stages. Moreover, whenever a
topos T is Boolean, it can be easily be shown that the semantics defined
by the above is just the standard classical set-theoretic semantics [26]. The
distinction between the above construction and the latter is that this is a con-
structive form of classical semantics, since it is a requirement, for example,
that for α∨ ∼ α to be satisfied by TB , that we have produced a conclusive
proof of α, or a conclusive refutation of α. Once a proposition is established
true or false is, therefore, dependent upon the state of reasoning at a given
time, but once it is so established, by the property of monotonicity, it remains
true or false at all subsequent stages.
In other words, by syntactically separating T and TC we are capable of
controlling collapse, allowing for collapse to Boolean topos only in case there
exists a conclusive proof or refutation for some formula. This reflects the fact
that, in our co-constructive logic, decidability comes at the end of a process
of dialogue between attempted proof or refutation of that formula. In this
way, we have provided a proof-theoretic semantics for symmetric dialogue
between topoi for proofs and refutations. Moreover, far from collapse being
problematic for this structure, we utilize it in order to model conclusive solu-
tions that may be understood to adhere to broadly classical principles. The
“space” of problems, represented by the dialogue structure between T and
TC , is a space of potential proofs and refutations. The “space” of solutions,
represented by the Boolean topos TB , is a space of actual and conclusive
proofs and refutations. In other words, the proof-theoretic construction ad-
equate to co-constructive logic lies beneath what is, essentially, a bivalent
structure of conclusive propositions.
7. Backmatter
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